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Private Equity (or PE) Investment is a type of collective investment scheme 
through which investors make equity investment in private companies with capital 
raised predominantly through private placement. Investors of a PE fund share in 
investment returns and assume investment risks according to their proportional 
capital contributions.   
Funds of which the primary purpose is to invest in private equity, or PE Funds,  
have become the third largest financial market after security issuances and bank 
credits, and it has been playing an increasingly important role. However, Private 
Equity Investment involves a twofold principal-agent relationship,—one between 
fund investors and the fund manager, and the other between fund manager and  
both company managers. This double agency relationship further complicates and 
aggravates the principal-agent problem. Starting with the twofold principal-agent 
relationship, this Study explores the possibility of a complete principal-agent 
mechanism in PE investment by constructing and analyzing the theoretical model 
and tests the validity of the model through empirical research.  
The Study proceeds with the following steps: 
1. Qualitative analysis: developing the analytical framework of this Study by 
making qualitative analysis of the present agency problems associated with PE 
Investments. 
2. Comparative analysis: drawing on advanced experiences from Europe, the 
U.S., Japan, and the Taiwan Region of China by analyzing the development and 
evolution of PE Investments in these jurisdictions to reach theoretical deductions 
3. Empirical Research: utilizing empirical methods including surveys and 
interviews to test the applicability of theoretical models to better simulate the 
principal-agent problem in reality.  
4. Theoretical modeling: constructing a dynamic-game model with three 













theoretical simulations on the principal-agent relationship in practice. 
Combining theoretical abstraction and empirical testing enhances the value of 
this Study by constructing a systematic link between the reality and model and by 
verifying the soundness of both conclusions and analysis. 
This Study thus makes the following microscopic and macroscopic 
conclusions.  
There are two main microscopic conclusions. Firstly, in resolving 
principal-agent problems between Investors and PE Fund Manager, reputation 
mechanism and compensation incentive mechanism are proved to be effective in 
practice.  The Study demonstrates that reputation in the GP Market and a 
compensation scheme that combines a management fee and profit incentives well 
resolves the moral risk involved in the first layer of principal-agent relationship.  
Secondly, the PE-Target Company Model shows that the efforts made by the parties 
are positively correlated. Interviews, however, indicate that too much intervention 
by PE fund in the operation of the target company often lead to adverse results and 
should thus be limited. 
The main macroscopic conclusion is that the Limited Partnership is the best 
model for PE Investment in China. 
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